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COURTSIDE 
BY PAUL M. SMITH, KATHERINE A. FALLOW, DANIEL MACH, AND AARON A. BRUHL 
As sometimes happens, the most dramatic 
development at the Supreme Court for 
First Amendment lawyers in recent 
weeks probably was the denial of review 
in reporter's privilege cases arising 
from the disclosure of the identity of 
Valerie Plame as a CIA operative-an 
action that resulted in the jailing of one 
prominent journalist. 
Miller v. United States; 
Cooper v. United States 
Turning away a request to rule on the 
viability of a federal reporter's privilege, 
the Supreme Court on June 27, 2005, 
denied certiorari in Miller v. United 
States, No. 04-1507, and Cooper v. 
United States, No. 05-1508. The peti-
tioners-New York Times reporter Judith 
Miller, Time magazine reporter Matthew 
Cooper, and Time's corporate publish-
er -had been held in contempt of court 
for refusing to disclose the identities of 
their confidential sources. 
The case arose in the wake of 
President George W. Bush's statement, 
during the 2003 State of the Union 
address, that British intelligence had 
learned that Iraq had sought uranium 
from Africa. In July 2003, amid public 
controversy over the justification for the 
war in Iraq, former Ambassador Joseph 
Wilson published an op-ed reporting 
that in 2002 he had been dispatched to 
Niger to investigate the matter and had 
found no credible evidence of such 
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efforts. Shortly thereafter, columnist 
Robert Novak wrote a piece revealing 
that "senior administration officials" 
told him that Wilson had been sent to 
Iraq on the recommendation of his wife, 
Valerie Plame, a CIA "operative." Critics 
of the Bush administration alleged that 
White House officials leaked the infor-
mation in order to retaliate against 
Wilson. The Department of Justice began 
an investigation into whether administra-
tion officials had violated a federal law 
prohibiting disclosing the identity of a 
covert agent. 
The special counsel heading the 
investigation opened a grand jury inquiry 
and subpoenaed several reporters in an 
effort to determine the source of the 
leak. Miller, Cooper, and Time refused 
to reveal their sources, claiming that 
they enjoyed a privilege under the First 
Amendment and federal common law. 
The district court rejected those argu-
ments and held the petitioners in con-
tempt, with imposition of sanctions 
stayed pending the completion of appel-
late proceedings. On appeal, the D.C. 
Circuit (Judges Sentelle, Henderson, 
and Tatel) affirmed the judgment. The 
court held that Branzburg v. Hayes' 
foreclosed the First Amendment argu-
ment. The court split three different 
ways on the common law argument but 
concluded that, if such a privilege exist-
ed at all, the government had made a 
sufficient showing to overcome it. 
The petitions for certiorari argued 
that the lower courts are in disarray in 
their interpretations of Branzburg and in 
their rulings on the reporter's privilege. 
The petitions urged the Court to recog-
nize a common law privilege under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and to 
clarify or revisit the holding in Branzburg. 
The petitions also renewed the argu-
ment, rejected below, that the contempt 
proceedings violated due process 
because the courts relied on evidence to 
which the petitioners never had been 
given access. The petitioners were sup-
ported by amicus briefs from dozens of 
major media and journalists' entities, 
a libertarian advocacy group, and the 
attorneys general of thirty-four states and 
the District of Columbia. The brief of the 
attorneys general in support of certiorari 
was particularly striking in arguing that 
the absence of a federal privilege frustrat-
ed state policies because all of those 
states (in addition to almost every other 
state in the country) recognize some form 
of reporter's privilege. 
The Supreme Court, however, 
declined to accept review. (Justice 
Breyer did not participate in the decision 
to deny certiorari.) Shortly thereafter, 
Miller was sent to jail in Alexandria, 
Virginia; Cooper testified before the 
grand jury after receiving a direct waiver 
from his source, Karl Rove; and Time 
released Cooper's notes to the special 
counsel. The future and scope of the 
federal reporter's privilege continues to 
be uncertain, thus prompting renewed 
efforts to enact federal legislation that 
will afford protection to journalists simi-
lar to that given by forty-nine states and 
the District of Columbia. 
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass 'n 
In one of the few merits cases last 
Term involving the First Amendment 
guarantee of freedom of speech, the 
Supreme Court in Johanns v. Livestock 
Marketing Ass'n, Nos. 03-1164 and 
03-1165, reversed a lower court deci-
sion that had invalidated a federal pro-
gram arranging for a beef promotional 
campaign funded via a mandatory 
assessment on all beef producers and 
importers. The Eighth Circuit, relying 
on the Supreme Court's prior decision 
in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 2 
had held that this mandatory assessment 
of fees to fund commercial speech on 
behalf of the beef industry constituted 
a form of coerced speech violating the 
First Amendment. The United Foods 
case, which barred a mandatory assess-
ment to fund mushroom advertising, 
had in turn distinguished the earlier 
decision of the Supreme Court in 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 
Inc., 3 which upheld a mandatory assess-
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ment on growers of California tree fruit 
on the theory that the generic advertis-
ing at issue was part of a larger regula-
tory program that in effect collectivized 
the operations of those growers. 
In the Livestock Marketing case, the 
Court for the first time addressed the 
argument that these types of mandatory 
assessments do not implicate First 
Amendment concerns because the adver-
tising at issue constitutes "government 
speech" and the Constitution allows the 
government to demand that the citizenry, 
or some subset thereof, fund government 
speech. (That issue had been raised in 
United Foods but too late to be address-
ed by the Court.) In an opinion written 
by Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief 
Justice and Justices O'Connor, Thomas, 
and Breyer, the Court accepted the argu-
ment that the advertising was really the 
government speaking and thus the beef 
producers who objected to funding it 
lacked a valid constitutional claim. 
"Government Speech" 
Responding to the argument that the 
Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and 
Research Board Operating Committee 
that actually receives the money and 
arranges for the advertising is not the 
government, the Court noted that its 
activities were comprehensively con-
trolled by the Secretary of Agriculture. 
Half of the members are selected by the 
Secretary and every word uttered in an 
advertisement must be approved by the 
Secretary. The Court also rejected the 
argument that speech cannot be govern-
ment speech if it is funded with a tar-
geted assessment on beef producers. It 
left for another day the argument that 
specific advertising violates the First 
Amendment if it states that the message 
is being provided by beef producers, 
rather than the government. 
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the 
result, rejecting the government speech 
argument and maintaining her prior 
position that this kind of program can 
be treated as a permissible form of eco-
nomic regulation of an industry. 
Justice Souter, joined by Justice 
Stevens and Justice Kennedy, dissented. 
They relied primarily on the argument 
that the government may not invoke the 
government speech argument unless it 
has revealed to the public its responsi-
bility for the speech at issue-especial-
ly when the funding comes from a tar-
geted assessment. 
Rumsfeld v. FAIR 
On November 29, 2005, the Supreme 
Court will hear argument in Rumsfeld v. 
Forum for Academic and Institutional 
Rights ("FAIR"), No. 04-1152, a chal-
lenge to a series of federal funding 
restrictions collectively known as the 
Solomon Amendment. The FAIR case 
raises several core First Amendment 
issues, including the contours of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
the delineation between speech and 
conduct, and the constitutional limits 
on government-compelled speech. 
In its present form, the Solomon 
Amendment denies federal funds to 
any institution of higher education that 
does not provide military recruiters 
with access to its campus and students 
on par with the access available to other 
employers. The statute not only covers 
funding from a wide variety of federal 
agencies-including, among others, the 
Departments of Defense, Labor, Health 
and Human Services, Education, 
Homeland Security, and Transportation-
but also penalizes a parent university for 
the actions of any of its "subelements," 
such as its law school. Consequently, 
because the military's "don't ask, don't 
tell" policy openly discriminates against 
gays and lesbians, the Solomon Amend-
ment presents schools with the choice of 
either abandoning their long-standing 
nondiscrimination policies, which cover 
recruiting as well other core campus 
activities, or foresaking hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in federal funds. 
A broad coalition of law schools, 
professors, and students challenged the 
Solomon Amendment, and in a two-to-
one decision the Third Circuit enjoined 
enforcement of the law in November 
2004.4 As an initial matter, the Third 
Circuit held that the law is properly 
analyzed within the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, notwithstanding the 
government's efforts to shield the fund-
ing condition from constitutional scruti-
ny. The court then concluded that the 
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Solomon Amendment interferes with 
the schools' constitutional rights in two 
related ways. First, the Third Circuit 
reasoned, the law dilutes the schools' 
First Amendment right of associational 
expression by requiring federally funded 
schools not only to permit, but actually to 
facilitate, activities the schools seek to 
condemn. Second, the court of appeals 
held, the Solomon Amendment effectu-
ates a system of compelled speech, under 
which law schools must affirmatively aid 
military recruiters in disseminating their 
message. Addressing the government's 
asserted interest in seeking to raise and 
support a military, the Third Circuit 
deemed that interest to be a "vital" one, 
but noted that the government had 
offered "no evidence that would support 
the necessity of requiring law schools to 
provide the military with a forum for, 
and assistance in, recruiting."5 
Potential Reverberations 
In the Supreme Court, the government 
advances several arguments that, if 
accepted, likely would reverberate well 
beyond this case. For example, the gov-
ernment advocates a narrow view of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
under which the First Amendment limits 
Congress's Spending Clause authority 
only when a funding condition aims "at 
the suppression of dangerous ideas"; all 
other speech-related funding conditions, 
the government argues, are wholly insu-
lated from constitutional review. Under 
the government's theory, if a funding 
recipient objects to any given funding 
restriction, the recipient's only recourse 
is to decline the funds in question, 
regardless of the amounts involved or 
the relationship between the restriction 
and the funding scheme in question. 
In addition, the federal petitioners 
challenge the basic premises underlying 
respondents' expressive association 
claim. Addressing the respondents' 
asserted associational rights, the gov-
ernment invokes the Court's seminal 
decision in United States v. O'Brien, 6 
and argues that the schools' recruiting 
functions and nondiscrimination poli-
cies simply are not expressive conduct 
entitled to any constitutional protection. 
If accepted on its terms, the government's 
argument could effectively narrow the 
class of conduct falling within the ambit 
of the First Amendment. 
Finally, the government is pressing 
a limiting view of the compelled speech 
doctrine. Building on the Court's recent 
decision in Johanns v. Livestock 
Marketing Association7 (discussed 
above), the federal defendants contend 
that the doctrine is inapplicable to the 
Solomon Amendment, because the 
expression in question is "government 
speech" and, therefore, entirely beyond 
the purview of the First Amendment. 
This case thus presents the Court with its 
first opportunity to elaborate on newly 
clarified "government speech" theory. 
Whether the Court will accept the 
government's invitation to reshape free 
speech doctrine in the context of the 
FAIR case, of course, remains unclear. 
But given the complex, intersecting 
First Amendment issues at play in 
FAIR, the free speech bar undoubtedly 
will follow the case with great interest. 
Tory v. Cochran 
On May 31, 2005, the United States 
Supreme Court in Tory v. Cochran8 
vacated a broad injunction obtained by 
famed lawyer Johnnie Cochran prevent-
ing a former client from picketing and 
publicly speaking about Cochran, hold-
ing that the injunction lacked justifica-
tion after Cochran's recent death and 
was an unconstitutional restraint on the 
client's First Amendment rights. The 
Court did so, however, without passing 
on the more significant First Amendment 
questions presented by the case. 
The case grew out of a successful 
defamation action brought in California 
by Cochran against Ulysses Tory. The 
state trial court found that Tory had 
engaged in an extended campaign of 
unlawful defamatory activity, and further 
that he had used such defamatory speech 
in at attempt to coerce Cochran into pay-
ing him a monetary "tribute" to desist 
from his activities. The court issued an 
injunction preventing Tory and his asso-
ciates from picketing Cochran's offices 
and from making any oral statements 
about Cochran in any public forum. The 
California Court of Appeal affirmed, and 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine "[ w ]hether a permanent 
injunction as a remedy in a defamation 
action, preventing all future speech about 
an admitted public figure, violates the 
First Amendment." 
While the case was pending, and 
after oral argument, Cochran died. 
Counsel for Cochran and his widow, 
who was substituted as respondent, 
moved the Court to dismiss the case as 
moot. In a seven-to-two opinion, the 
Court vacated the judgment of the 
California Court of Appeal. Justice 
Breyer, writing for the majority, first 
held that the case did not become moot 
upon Cochran's death. Noting that no 
California law automatically invalidated 
the injunction, and that Tory could not 
know whether the injunction was void 
until a court ruled on it, the Court 
observed that the injunction continued 
to restrain Tory's speech and therefore 
presented an ongoing controversy. 
But the Court went on to note that, 
although it did not moot the case, 
Cochran's death did make unnecessary 
any consideration of "petitioners' basic 
claims." "Rather," the Court explained, 
"we need only point out that the injunc-
tion, as written, has lost its underlying 
rationale," which was to prevent Tory 
from coercing Cochran to pay him a 
tribute. As a result, the injunction as 
written became "an overly broad prior 
restraint upon speech, lacking plausible 
justification." Justice Thomas, joined by 
Justice Scalia, dissented, arguing that 
the writ of certiorari should have been 
dismissed as improvidently granted, and 
criticizing the majority for "strain[ing] 
to reach the merits of the injunction 
after Cochran's death." 
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